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Abstract 
 Current policies designed to improve food safety rely on regulation and market 
incentives. However, the mix of both private and public incentives to improve food safety 
and the dynamics of industry response to regulation make analysis of the costs of food 
safety complex. The paper provides an overview of costs of food safety regulation and 
control in recent literature for both pesticide and microbial controls and draws lessons for 
identifying cost-effective food safety approaches. Four lessons emerge concerning 
industry compliance costs. First, the distribution of costs is likely to be more important 
than market price effects. Second, regulation has an impact on long-run incentives to 
invest in new technologies or inputs and therefore may bias the nature of productivity 
growth. Third, an analysis of costs informs the choice among regulatory alternatives; 
allowing market adjustments to mitigate costs and improving upon existing market 
incentives is likely to be the most effective ways to reach public health goals. And fourth, 
a risk-based systems approach can be the best way to understand the costs, incentives, 
and risk outcomes resulting from alternative interventions. However this approach is 
made difficult by patchwork regulatory authority across the food chain and lack of data 
required for risk assessment.   
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INDUSTRY COMPLIANCE COSTS:  
WHAT WOULD THEY LOOK LIKE IN A RISK-BASED  
INTEGRATED FOOD SYSTEM? 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper, first presented at the Resources for the Future conference titled “Risk-
Based Priority Setting in an Integrated Food Safety System,” is motivated by the 
observation that there may be missed opportunities for reducing risks in the food supply. 
In simplest terms, we want to identify food safety improvements that have the highest 
benefit-cost ratios. Other papers given at this conference examined emerging knowledge 
about the sources and incidence of foodborne risks. The purpose of our paper is to 
examine the costs of reducing those risks. We want to identify where food safety can be 
improved with the least burden on the food industry and, hence, the least cost to society.  
In the case of food safety, the dynamics of industry response to regulation and the 
mix of both private and public incentives to improve food safety make analysis of 
regulatory costs more complex. This is because the market failure in food safety is never 
a complete failure. There are market incentives to improve food safety, and firms may 
adopt hazard control measures either to capture such incentives or in anticipation of more 
stringent regulation (Segerson 1999). Thus, the additional or marginal costs of regulation 
may be difficult to identify. However, we presume that the goal is improved food safety, 
whether achieved through regulation or through market incentives, and that the key is to 
identify those cost-effective opportunities, and then to identify the type of mechanisms 
that will encourage industry to take advantage of those opportunities.  
The existing literature about the costs of compliance with food safety regulation is 
conditioned by the kinds of regulation and how long they have been in place. The 
regulations vary widely among hazards, food types, and stages of the production chain.  
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We divide our review into two parts, reflecting fundamental differences between 
regulation of chemical and microbial hazards. The literature on the costs of pesticide 
regulation reflects more than two decades of ex post experience with regulations initiated 
in the mid-1970s; it focuses mainly on the costs of regulation in crop production. The 
literature on microbial hazards is newer and arises in response to more recent regulatory 
initiatives in the 1990s; it focuses on the livestock product subsector.1    
The paper begins with an overview of the types of costs at issue in regulatory cost-
benefit analysis, the types of economic modeling tools that have been used to measure 
costs, and the lessons from environmental economics regarding regulatory alternatives. 
We provide an overview of whether and how those tools have been applied to food safety 
regulation. Next, we summarize the findings from studies of pesticide regulation, and 
then we turn to studies of microbial regulation and draw lessons from each contribution 
to the literature. We focus on what is known about the structure of costs and what is 
known about the market incentives to improve food safety. We then turn to an 
examination of a systems approach to identification of cost-effective means of improving 
food safety as the most promising approach for identifying cost-effective changes to 
current practices. Finally, we conclude by offering some questions for future data 
collection and research. 
 
Approaches to Measuring Social Costs 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently published guidelines for cost-
benefit analysis of environmental regulation (U.S. EPA 2000). These provide a useful 
starting point for our review. Table 1, adapted from EPA’s exhibit 8-2, gives examples of 
the kinds of costs that result from regulation; we have added some examples specific to 
food safety. These include the costs incurred by firms who must change production 
processes in some way to meet new standards, labeled real-resource compliance costs. 
Costs can be either fixed costs that require an investment over several years or variable 
costs that are incurred with each unit produced. Costs can be very concrete and easy to 
measure, such as the purchase of new equipment like the steam pasteurizer used in beef 
packing plants, or they can be more fuzzy, such as changes in labor organization to monitor  
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TABLE 1. Examples of social cost categories 
Social Cost 
Category General Examples Food Safety Examples 
Real-
Resource 
Compliance 
Costs 
Capital costs of new equipment 
Operation and maintenance of  
new equipment 
Change in production processes  
or inputs 
Maintenance changes in existing  
equipment 
Changes in input quality, such as  
skilled labor 
Changes in costs due to product  
quality; can be positive or negative 
  
Steam pasteurizer 
Additional water needed 
for rinses 
Higher price of new 
pesticides 
More frequent cleaning 
 
Training of employees in 
HACCP procedures 
Lower quality of product 
with reduced pesticide use 
 
Social 
Welfare 
Losses 
Higher consumer and producer prices  
leading to changes in consumer and  
producer surplus 
 
Legal/administrative costs 
Higher prices for crops with 
lost pesticide uses 
Higher prices for meat 
 products  
Higher insurance costs  
against recalls 
 
Transitional 
Social Costs 
Firm closings 
Unemployment 
Resource shifts to other markets 
Transactions costs 
Disrupted production 
Regional shifts in crop 
 production  
Small meat processing plants 
 shut down 
Reduced stock value due  
to recalls 
Source: Adapted from Exhibit 8-2, in U.S. EPA “Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analysis” (2000).    
Note that Government Sector Regulatory Costs have been deleted, as these are beyond the scope of the paper. 
 
temperatures. The simplest kind of cost analysis is simply an accounting for these costs 
within a static framework (e.g., so many plants pay so much extra per unit of output).  
These direct costs to firms lead to other changes in markets, such as social welfare 
losses from higher consumer prices for meat products, or transitional social costs, such as 
possible firm closings due to the firms’ inability to competitively meet standards (Just, 
Hueth, and Schmitz 1982). In measuring the latter two categories, both the distribution of 
real-resource costs and the adjustments to these costs are taken into account more fully.  
Adjustments may lead to lower costs over time as firms find more efficient ways to 
comply with standards, and understanding such adjustments is important for comparing 
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regulatory alternatives. Furthermore, the distribution of costs both between consumers 
and producers and among different kinds of producers and consumers will have important 
political economy implications. 
Table 2 shows the kinds of modeling tools used by economists to measure compli-
ance costs and their impacts on markets. Measuring direct compliance costs and their 
partial equilibrium impact on the market in question is usually the focus of regulatory 
analysis. Economists have extended this analysis in some cases to look more generally at 
impacts on several markets or at general equilibrium impacts in both factor and output 
markets. For example, Unnevehr, Gomez, and Garcia (1998) examined how HACCP 
costs would affect the three major meat product markets differently, due to differences in 
the incidence of costs and resulting substitutions in demand among beef, pork, and 
chicken. These substitutions reduced the total welfare cost of the regulation. Another 
example is the general equilibrium analysis of HACCP by Golan et al. (2000), who found 
that costs of implementation were almost fully passed through to households as a 
reduction in income (more than offset by a reduction in health care costs on the benefit 
side). The distribution of costs and benefits varied among household types, with the 
greatest net benefits going to households with children. 
These kinds of modeling efforts are useful for illuminating the long-run effects of the 
regulation and their resulting costs. Such dynamics are important in determining 
incentives for innovation and compliance, and much of the economics literature has 
focused on the choice among regulatory approaches.  
 
Choosing Regulatory Approaches that Result  
in Least-Cost Compliance 
 Government interventions can take many forms. We distinguish between direct 
command and control (CAC) interventions and information-based interventions that 
provide incentives for private market solutions (Litan and Nordhaus 1983; Ippolito 1984). 
Direct interventions include CAC standards for performance, for example, pathogen 
counts or residue tolerances for products at some stage of the marketing channel. Such 
standards require the product’s quality to be monitored, usually based on sampling and  
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TABLE 2. Modeling tools and their uses in food safety cost analysis 
Modeling Tools Examples in Food Safety 
Direct Compliance Costs FSIS analysis for Pathogen Reduction Rule 
(USDA-FSIS 1996) estimated costs of training, 
changes in production processes for meat and 
poultry plants. 
Partial Equilibrium Analysis Roosen and Hennessy (2001) estimate the market 
effects of banning organophosphates for apples 
and compare welfare effects of different policies. 
Lichtenberg, Parker, and Zilberman (1988) 
estimate market effects of banning ethyl parathion 
in three tree crops and show distribution of social 
welfare costs among producers, consumers, and 
export markets. 
Multimarket Model Unnevehr, Gomez, and Garcia (1998) analyze 
impact of Pathogen Reduction Rule on different 
meat product markets and find that substitution in 
demand reduces social welfare losses. 
General Equilibrium Analysis Golan et al. (2000) use a Social Accounting Matrix 
to see general equilibrium effects from changes in 
medical expenses and meat processing costs as a 
result of HACCP in meat/poultry; they find that 
net benefits are higher among certain kinds of 
households. 
Variable Cost Function Antle (2000) estimates costs of improving quality 
and safety in meat plants based on past changes in 
input costs associated with higher product prices. 
Risk Analysis Model Narrod et al. (1999) examine points of intervention 
to reduce E. coli O157:H7 in beef packing plants 
and find rising marginal costs of control.  
Linear Programming Model Onal, Unnevehr, and Bekric (2000) use a regional 
supply and demand optimization model to estimate 
the impact of Salmonella restrictions on hogs 
delivered to packing plants and find reallocation of 
regional supply. 
Source:  Suggested by section 8.4 in U.S. EPA “Guidelines for Economic Analysis” (2000). 
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testing.  In contrast, CAC processing standards achieve an improved final product by 
directly specifying procedures to be followed in production. Examples include worker  
re-entry restrictions for pesticide application or required sanitary operating procedures in 
meat plants. A third type of CAC approach is mandatory disclosure of information. 
Examples include requiring producers to provide information on any food safety 
processes they use, such as irradiation. 
In contrast with CAC, incentive-based approaches are designed to induce either 
producers or consumers to identify and practice cost-effective methods that achieve 
improved food safety. Such interventions might include taxes on inputs with food 
safety risks, which would encourage their use only where marginal value product is 
highest; or information for consumers that allows them to evaluate and avoid a hazard; 
or facilitation of private contracting through public certification of products that meet a 
minimum safety standard. 
The environmental economics literature demonstrates that there is a hierarchy among 
regulatory approaches from an economic efficiency perspective (Cropper and Oates 
1992). The most desirable is an incentives-based approach that allows producers and 
consumers to choose the most efficient level of pollution. This is accomplished either by 
creating a market for the negative externality (e.g., tradable pollution rights), or by the 
application of optimal pollution taxes. Incentives-based approaches are preferable to 
CAC, which reduces efficiency by constraining market choice. Among CAC approaches, 
process standards are less efficient than performance standards. They specify how firms 
should achieve pollution reduction goals rather than specifying a performance standard 
and allowing firms to choose the least expensive process for achieving it (Besanko 1987). 
Setting performance standards, allowing choice of production methods, and fostering 
innovation to meet standards should allow greater efficiency in meeting a particular 
public health goal. Helfand (1991) demonstrated that setting a direct restriction on the 
level of pollution resulted in the highest level of economic returns and production 
efficiency among five different performance and process standards. 
Alternative regulatory approaches to achieve the greatest risk reduction at the lowest 
cost have been proposed in the food safety literature, as we will discuss below. But 
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feasible incentives-based approaches differ between types of hazards. The presence of 
hazardous production inputs that are man-made, and are added as the result of producer 
decisions, can be influenced by incentives-based measures such as taxes. Naturally 
occurring hazards that can enter at any point in the food chain are expensive to test for 
and require different approaches (i.e., they cannot be taxed). The high cost of information 
that creates the market failure for microbial hazards also makes a performance standard 
impractical. We discuss this issue further in a subsequent section. 
 
Costs of Pesticide Regulation 
 Pesticides are regulated by the EPA, which registers chemicals for particular use 
(i.e., for a specific crop), regulates application procedures, and sets tolerances for 
residues. Food safety is one of many criteria used in these regulations; environmental and 
farm worker safety are also important. It is widely recognized that food safety risks are 
very important in determining whether a particular use is allowed. The 1996 Food 
Quality Protection Act (FQPA) set a consistent standard for risks from pesticide residues 
in food, eliminating the double standard created by the previous division of regulation 
between the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) for crop 
residues and the Delaney clause of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) 
for processed foods (Osteen 2001). The FQPA standard requires reasonable certainty that 
no harm will result to infants and children from aggregate exposure to all residues and 
also instructs that costs will not be considered in setting this standard. The FQPA requires 
reassessment of pesticide tolerances for all currently registered pesticides, and the EPA 
has given priority to organophosphates because of their importance in children’s dietary 
exposure. Organophosphates are widely used in field crops and in fruits and vegetables 
important in children’s diets (e.g., apples) (Osteen 2001). This potential loss of pesticides 
that are currently widely used lends some urgency to examining the lessons from past 
analysis of pesticide regulation. 
Three themes emerge from the pesticide literature:  
1. there are small marginal costs to banning any particular use, but these rise as 
more uses are banned and fewer substitutes are available;  
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2. the practice of banning particular uses makes regulation more costly and the 
same benefits could be achieved at lower cost through different regulatory 
mechanisms that allocate pesticide uses where they have highest value; and  
3. the high costs of registration for new pesticides have discouraged development 
of new alternatives.  
We examine each theme below. 
 The benefits from use of pesticides in crop production can be interpreted as both 
significant and insignificant, depending on the standard being used. Teague and Brorsen 
(1995) report that the ratio of the marginal value product of pesticide use to pesticide 
price in three states is much greater than one, indicating the strong profits attached to 
pesticide use. Gren (1994) found that a hypothetical 50 percent reduction in pesticide use 
in Sweden would result in a 6 percent reduction in farm incomes.  Hanson, Lichtenberg, 
and Peters (1997) find that organic grain production in the mid-Atlantic can achieve 
yields comparable with conventional agriculture but requires more family labor and 
management, whose value is difficult to quantify. Thus, while pesticides are found to be 
profitable to use, the estimated costs of banning or restricting their use depend on the 
particular crop and the assumptions made. 
Zilberman et al. (1991) and Osteen (1994) summarize the literature regarding the 
costs of banning pesticide uses and provide a number of insights about why results of 
regulatory cost estimates can vary widely. First, the estimated costs of banning a 
pesticide use depend crucially on the availability of substitute chemicals for that use. As 
entire classes of pesticides are restricted or canceled, there are fewer substitutes available, 
and the cost of the restrictions rises (Roosen and Hennessy 2001). Second, a major effect 
of banning a pesticide is to shift production to regions with less need for pesticide use. If 
this supply response is fairly elastic, then there is less impact on market prices of the 
crop, but there is also a clear regional redistribution of farm income (Lichtenberg, Parker, 
and Zilberman 1988). In particular, agriculture in the southern United States is more 
likely to be impacted by pesticide restrictions than are other regions, as the agro-climatic 
conditions favor pests (Osteen 1994). Third, market price impacts of pesticide bans 
depend upon the elasticity of supply response, including the availability of substitutes and 
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the ease of shifting production to other regions. When the crop is traded, the price effects 
in domestic markets are mitigated by changes in exports or imports, but the higher costs 
for domestic producers make them less competitive in world markets (Zilberman et al. 
1991). Fourth, research and development to find substitutes or safer alternatives 
substantially reduces the cost of regulation in the long run (Osteen 1994). 
Many economists have pointed out that the use of pesticide bans is an economically 
inefficient way of reducing risks from pesticides (Gren 1994; Zilberman et al. 1991; 
Zilberman and Millock 1997; Swinton and Batie 2001).  Regulation that bans pesticide 
use often is more costly than other approaches that lead to similar reductions. Banning 
the use of a pesticide on a crop does not necessarily reduce use where its use causes the 
greatest harm. Equivalent or greater risk reductions could be achieved at lower cost by 
alternative policies that allocate pesticide risks toward their highest value uses. Such 
policies might include pesticide taxes, which could vary by crop or location of use, or 
tradable rights to use pesticides, which producers could buy and sell. This would allocate 
pesticide use toward crops and regions where it has highest marginal value product while 
still achieving target average residues. Another alternative policy would be to set residue 
limits for food products rather than for crops, in order to create incentives to directly 
address food safety risks (Swinton and Batie 2001). This would encourage a “systems” 
approach to reducing residues. Unfortunately, such alternatives are not under 
consideration, so the current review of registrations under FQPA may result in 
widespread bans and higher costs of production for many crops.  
 A third theme in the pesticide literature is that regulation has discouraged the 
development of new chemicals and sometimes reduced the availability of existing 
chemicals. The high cost of supporting re-registrations for some pesticides discourages 
their support by manufacturers, especially for so-called minor uses (i.e., crops with 
limited acreage) (Osteen 1994). Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo (1995) estimate that 
development of a new pesticide takes 11 years and can cost manufacturers between $50 
and $70 million. They also found that regulation encourages the development of less 
toxic pesticide materials and of biological pesticides as an alternative to chemical 
pesticides. But regulation discourages new chemical registrations, encourages firms to 
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abandon registrations for minor crops, and favors large firms over smaller ones. The 
emphasis on reducing crop residues to meet a food safety standard also means that newer 
chemicals decay more rapidly but may also be more toxic to farmworkers (Rola and 
Pingali 1993). Thus, regulation creates incentives that influence the long-run pace and 
direction of new technology development. 
 The three themes in the pesticide literature provide important lessons. First, the 
redistribution effects among producing regions are likely to be more important than direct 
price effects in crop markets. Second, the choice of regulatory instruments has important 
implications for the costs of regulation. Third, the design of regulation influences long-
run incentives for the development of new technologies. These lessons have some 
application in the emerging regulation of microbial hazards.  
 
Costs of Regulating Microbial Hazards 
Growing scientific awareness of the importance of foodborne pathogens led to new 
regulatory initiatives in the 1990s.  Advances in public health (e.g., improved information 
through faster and more sensitive tests for pathogens as well as better epidemiology) 
permitted improved surveillance of foodborne illnesses, linked specific foods and 
companies with pathogen contamination, and identified known human illnesses as 
complications of acute foodborne infections. New federal initiatives to address microbial 
hazards include HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points) regulations in 
seafood, meat and poultry, and fruit juices (U.S. FDA 1995; USDA-FSIS 1996; U.S. 
FDA 2001); the development of Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) guidelines for 
produce (U.S. FDA 1998); and regulations regarding shell egg handling (U.S. FDA 
2000). As these new regulations and guidelines developed, a literature emerged to 
evaluate the impact on the food industry. Because experiences and data collection are 
recent, this literature is still evolving. It is more difficult to establish “lessons” in this area 
than in the case of pesticides.  
In contrast to pesticides, which are man-made substances added during production, 
microbial hazards are naturally occurring organisms. Often, they can enter food products 
throughout the food supply/production chain, and, once present, they can grow in 
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numbers. Therefore control at one level does not assure control at subsequent levels; and 
lack of control at one level has consequences for the following stages in the food chain. 
This makes hazard control and the design of regulation more complex; it also complicates 
economic analysis of the costs of control.  
 One issue debated in the 1990s is the nature of HACCP as a regulatory standard. 
HACCP was initially developed in the 1960s by private industry as a management tool 
(Mazzocco 1996). As such, it provides efficiency in managing processes when the 
hazards and standards are clearly defined. That is, it can reduce the costs of testing, and 
of reworking or disposing of spoiled products, by preventing hazards and contamination. 
The focus on critical control points can lead to redesign of the production process to 
achieve control more efficiently. However, HACCP systems clearly entail costs, which 
are justified in private industry when there are market incentives for assuring a particular 
standard of safety.  
The costs of monitoring and testing are important for naturally occurring hazards, 
and are a motivation for a HACCP approach (National Research Council 1985). The high 
costs of obtaining information (i.e., testing for microbial hazards ex post) make it more 
economical to emphasize prevention and monitoring of easily accessible indicators, in 
either private or public efforts to reduce such hazards (Unnevehr and Jensen 1996; 
MacDonald and Crutchfield 1996). In the 1990s, HACCP was mandated by federal 
regulation for firms in the seafood and meat/poultry industries, and in 2001 for the fruit 
juice industry.  Specific HACCP plans are not mandated; under all three regulations, 
individual firms are to develop plans that are relevant to their particular product mix and 
plant situation. These plans are then reviewed and approved by regulators. In the 
meat/poultry and fruit juice regulations, pathogen testing and reductions in pathogens are 
required. In the case of fruit juice, pathogen reduction is to be achieved through the use of 
a technology that meets a five log pathogen reduction performance standard reduction of 
generic E. coli.  
The flexibility in this type of regulation means that it is difficult to estimate its costs 
ex ante. For example, it is unclear what kind of changes in production processes might 
result from HACCP implementation. The flexibility in approach does not eliminate plant 
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heterogeneity in terms of pathogen levels, which is one reason to also specify pathogen 
reductions, as in the meat/poultry HACCP regulation (MacDonald and Crutchfield 1996). 
Thus, the nature of the HACCP regulation is unclear: Is it a performance standard or a 
process standard?  Unnevehr and Jensen (1999, 1996) and Antle (2000) describe the 
Pathogen Reduction Regulation in meat and poultry as a combination of performance and 
process standards. Helfand’s (1991) analysis provides insights regarding use of mixed 
standards. In her terminology, this regulation combines the mandated use of a pollution 
control technology (HACCP) with a standard on pollution per unit of output (percentage 
of samples with pathogens). This combination will tend to maintain high levels of output 
but will reduce economic returns more than would a direct restriction on the level of 
pollution. But this result depends on assumptions about the effect of the control 
technology on output and use of other inputs. For example, if HACCP does not contribute 
to production (changing only fixed costs with no change in marginal cost), then its 
imposition is equivalent to a direct restriction on the level of contamination. Thus, 
whether HACCP allows for efficient firm response to regulation is still unclear and will 
depend on how well it helps firms to meet associated pathogen standards and whether it 
leads to significant changes in the variable costs of production. 
Because ex ante costs are difficult to estimate and controversial in the food 
industry, there has been considerable interest in estimating HACCP costs as the 
regulations are implemented. For example, during the discussion period of the HACCP 
rule for meat and poultry, Texas A&M University released an alternative cost estimate 
that showed much higher initial costs for industry than the Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS) estimate (see Crutchfield et al. 1997 for a review and comparison). A 
number of studies have been undertaken of HACCP (see collection in Unnevehr 2000), 
and it is now possible to make some ex post comparisons and generalizations, although 
more definitive answers will only emerge after longer experience. Studies of the costs of 
pathogen reduction show that both the FSIS and the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) underestimated the costs of HACCP in their ex ante analyses. For example, Jensen 
and Unnevehr (2000) estimate that modifications of pork slaughter processes to reduce 
pathogens would cost $0.20 to $0.47 per carcass, substantially more than the FSIS 
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estimate of $0.0056 for process modifications (Crutchfield et al. 1997). Antle (2000) 
analyzed past costs of quality improvement in the meat industry and extrapolated that a 
20 percent improvement in safety would have additional costs in the range of $0.01 to 
$0.09 per pound of product, which is several times larger than the FSIS estimates of less 
than $0.001 per pound. Colatore and Caswell (2000) found that the FDA underestimated 
the cost of HACCP in seafood plants, particularly the costs of plan design, training, 
corrective actions, and sanitation.  
It is clear that the marginal costs of pathogen reduction are increasing and that 
complete control is quite costly. For example, Jensen, Unnevehr, and Gomez (1998) found 
that pathogen control marginal cost curves are steeply increasing in both beef and pork. 
Costs rise from $0.20 to $1.40 per beef carcass and from $0.03 cents to $0.25 per pork 
carcass as pathogen reduction increases from one log to four logs.2  Figure 1, from Jensen, 
Unnevehr, and Gomez (1998), shows costs and pathogen reductions for pork carcasses with 
different combinations of water rinses and sanitizing sprays. Costs increase from 
$0.03/carcass for a low temperature (25ºC) water rinse to more than $0.20 for the 
combination of hot (65ºC) water rinse and sanitizing spray, which achieves the greatest 
pathogen reduction. Figure 1 also shows that a cold water rinse plus sanitizing spray is 
more efficient than the 55ºC rinse and spray, which lies inside the cost frontier. Narrod et 
al. (1999) find rising costs of E. coli control in beef packing plants; costs rise from $0.05 to 
$0.45 per carcass as contamination is eliminated from 30 percent to 100 percent of 
production. Both of these studies emphasize that there is a frontier of efficient control 
technologies and technology combinations that provides least-cost pathogen reduction.  
Plants are not yet required to implement high levels of pathogen control (or 
elimination); the regulation requires that plants reduce their incidence to the pre-
regulation average for the animal species. Thus, to date, actual costs incurred by meat and 
poultry firms likely are still small relative to total costs and product prices. They may be 
around 1 to 2 percent of current processing costs (Jensen and Unnevehr 2000) and thus 
are unlikely to lead to major increases in meat prices.  
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FIGURE 1. Total enterics reduction for different technologies in pork 
 
While costs are small on average, they may still be enough to shift the distribution or 
scale of production at the margin. In both the seafood and meat/poultry industries, the 
impact of HACCP on small firms was an important consideration in the design of 
regulation. Both the meat/poultry and the fruit juice HACCP regulations were phased in 
with a longer adjustment period allowed for small plants. First time implementation of 
HACCP requires large up-front investments in developing and implementing the HACCP 
plan; these costs are lower on a per unit basis for larger food processors (Hooker, Siebert, 
and Nayga 2000;  Nganje and Mazzocco 2000). Therefore, small firms’ costs rise 
proportionally more than large firms’ with the implementation of HACCP, which may 
put them at a competitive disadvantage in the market. Furthermore, large firms frequently 
have more in-house resources at their disposal for design and implementation (e.g., meat 
scientists on staff; diagnostic labs) and therefore have lower transactions costs in 
implementing a HACCP plan. Some small firms might be expected to go out of business 
as a result of higher relative costs.3  Also, the need to have separate HACCP procedures 
for different products may also force small plants to drop some product lines (Hooker, 
Siebert, and Nayga 2000;  Nganje and Mazzocco 2000). However, the ultimate impact on 
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industry structure would be difficult to assign to food safety regulation alone, due to the 
high rate of plant closings and other forces contributing to firm consolidation 
(MacDonald and Crutchfield 1996).    
Another difficulty in assigning costs to regulation is that firms face a mix of market 
and regulatory incentives in adopting food safety measures. Certain markets increasingly 
demand evidence of hazard control from their suppliers, and this provides motivation 
beyond the minimum prescribed by regulation. Martin and Anderson (2000) report 
widespread adoption of HACCP and/or food safety control procedures among U.S. food 
processing firms. Almost 70 percent of large plants have a HACCP plan for at least one 
product; a majority of these firms also carry out food safety procedures associated with 
HACCP, such as monitoring temperatures of raw ingredients. Colatore and Caswell 
(2000) found that most seafood plants implemented more extensive and costly HACCP 
plans than required by regulation, because they found other motivations to do so. The 
implication is that market incentives are driving firms to adopt food safety practices. This 
then raises the question of what additional food safety is provided by regulation and what 
additional costs can be assigned to this improvement.  
Another issue in assessing costs is whether HACCP regulations in the processing 
industry will lead to greater demand for hazard reduction in farm-level production. In 
many ways, HACCP reduces communication costs about the provision of safety. Fewer 
studies have been conducted at the farm level because there has been little regulatory 
activity, but the application of regulation to one part of the food chain can create 
incentives that are passed back to suppliers through the marketplace. An important theme 
from the European literature is that food processors and retailers are increasingly looking 
for assurances of food safety from their suppliers, creating incentives for improved safety 
throughout the food chain. In the United Kingdom, the passage of “due diligence” laws 
has forced food retailers to ask their suppliers for certification of hazard management 
(Henson and Northen 1998), and ISO 9000 methods for certification have been applied in 
the UK meat sector  (Zaibet and Bredahl 1997).  
In the United States, such contracts tend to be motivated entirely by market 
incentives and there is less reported evidence that regulation has played a role. In the 
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meat subsector, fast-food services specify food safety standards in their contracts with 
suppliers (Burgdorfer 2001). Suppliers of produce to major U.S. supermarket chains must 
certify food safety practices, and this is true for international as well as domestic 
producers (Calvin and Cook 2001). In the produce market, this certification has been 
facilitated by the use of FDA’s GAP guidelines. 
There are a few studies at the farm level of hypothetical costs of adopting measures 
to reduce microbial hazards. Onal, Unnevehr, and Bekric (2000) examined the costs of 
restricting Salmonella contamination in hogs delivered to packing plants. Because there 
are differences in contamination levels by farm size and region, such restrictions would 
alter the regional distribution of production and increase costs for the system as a whole.  
Hayes et al. (1999) use Sweden’s experience with banning antibiotic use in pork 
production to draw lessons for a possible ban in the United States. They find that such a 
ban would tend to reward producers who are already managing productivity and quality 
well. Wang et al. (2000) find similar results for control of toxoplasmosis in pork. 
Confinement production would have a slight cost advantage if control of this infection 
became mandatory. These findings reinforce the general theme that regulation can 
influence industry structure and may influence the regional distribution of production at 
the farm level.  
An important structural issue that has not received much analysis is the outcome 
from new standards in markets with significant international trade. As trade in food 
products grows, the interaction of trade and regulation becomes more important. 
Regulations should apply equally to both domestic and imported foods. For example, 
seafood exports to the United States (which account for more than one-half of supply) 
should be processed under HACCP plans just as in domestic plants. However, 
enforcement of equivalent standards for foreign producers may be limited by the 
resources devoted to inspection and monitoring.  
The presence of imports or exports will influence market response to regulation and 
the incentives for domestic food safety improvement. Worth (2000) calculated the 
reputation cost of a food safety outbreak from strawberries for domestic producers. When 
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there are different supply sources, it is difficult for domestic producers to capture all of 
the benefits of safety improvement.  
The microbial hazards literature raises several themes but does not yet have well-
documented results. These themes include the difficulties of assessing HACCP costs and 
impacts due to the flexibility inherent in HACCP approaches; the likely rising marginal 
cost of food safety improvement; the presence of both private and regulatory incentives 
for improving food safety; and the likely structural implications of food safety regulation 
or market incentives for firm size, supply chain coordination, and international 
competitiveness.  
In addition, there are several important questions raised in the literature, which will 
require multidisciplinary research to address in the future. Once such question is what 
kind of regulatory approaches can best utilize incentives to increase food safety at least 
cost. In particular, can an enforceable standard be set for a naturally occurring hazard that 
is expensive to test for? If HACCP is flexible in implementation, then what improvement 
in food safety is actually achieved? Furthermore, given the difficulty of mapping 
pathogen reductions at one point in the food supply chain to illness outcomes in 
consumers, another question is how best to compare benefits and costs from HACCP 
regulations. All of these questions arise from the nature of microbial hazards and of 
process controls and lead us to explore whether a systems approach is the best way to 
find cost-effective improvements.  
 
Looking at the Entire Food System 
 Greater attention to food safety highlights the integrated nature of the food 
production system. Assignment of costs and changes in the nature of costs depend on 
understanding this integration. As discussed in the preceding sections, the nature of a 
food safety risk depends on the product and type of contamination. Some hazards, such as 
pesticides applied at the farm, enter the food chain system in early stages. Processing and 
handling affect the hazard levels on the food product as it goes through the system until it 
reaches the final consumer. In contrast, microbial hazards are naturally occurring; 
contamination can enter the food production system at any stage, and unless it is 
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eliminated at one stage in the production process, it can present problems at later stages 
of production. The controls of risks are linked across stages.     
Probabilistic Scenario Analysis (PSA) and closely related Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
are tools used to account for multiple events and the probability of any event occurring in 
the food production system (Roberts, Ahl, and McDowell 1995). The PSA makes use of 
information on links in the food chain and events that may compromise the safety of the 
food: the type of hazard, the different ways it enters the food chain (e.g., the specific link 
and linkages), and the full list of other expected events. The “links in the food chain” are 
specialized, self-contained activities that are connected to events that determine the 
human health outcome.  An “event tree” summarizes this information.  
One example is the occurrence of E. coli O157:H7 in cattle at slaughter (Roberts, 
Ahl, and McDowell 1995). Cattle shipped to slaughter may carry threshold levels of the 
pathogen. The probability that E. coli O157:H7 contamination will occur in cattle at 
slaughter depends on whether (and how likely it is that) cattle carry the pathogen and 
whether the pathogen is detected at entry to the slaughterhouse. The slaughter operation 
is one “link” in the food chain or processing system. Later stages in the system occur 
through processing and fabrication, distribution and transport, wholesale/retailing, and 
finally to the consumer level. In the food production system, each of these stages offers 
potential for contamination or recontamination. The PSA or FTA approach takes into 
account various linkages in the food system at a point in time, probabilities of occurrence, 
and all associated probabilities of failure (or, alternatively, effectiveness of control). The 
high-risk (or most likely) pathway becomes a likely candidate for control analysis.  
In principle, information on the probabilities and paths in the production system can 
be used to assign expected costs to various control options and to identify the most cost-
effective mitigation options. By identifying combinations of lowest-cost interventions to 
achieve various levels of improved safety, the analyst can articulate optimal strategies. 
This approach combines risk outcomes and economic cost criteria to identify dominant 
solutions (McDowell et al. 1995). The outcome and cost-dominance approach underlies 
the recently published models that identify the cost-efficient combinations of 
interventions when used to evaluate beef processing (Jensen, Unnevehr, and Gomez 
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1998; Narrod et al. 1999) and pork processing (Jensen and Unnevehr 2000). In principle, 
however, such prescriptive economics is more likely to depend on a combination of 
methods from decision theory, risk analysis, and economics (McDowell et al. 1995).4  
Although the PSA/FTA approach describes system linkages in food production, it gives 
little guidance for identifying strategies to reduce hazards across the whole system 
because it fails to account for incentives that may lead to different behaviors and choices 
of technologies and controls among stages.  
 Food safety failures often stem from problems that are systemic in nature. The 
systemic failures occur in production systems characterized by interconnected stages in 
production and inputs, and this interconnectivity gives rise to the technological potential 
for failures. At the same time, incentive problems provide the economic potential for 
failures (Hennessy, Roosen, and Miranowski 2000; Narrod et al. 1999). The mixing of 
meat from a number of farm sources at the packer, processing, or intermediary levels 
illustrates both the interconnectivity in inputs and stages of production and incentive 
problems. Ground meat may come from many different animal/farm sources. Problems 
that occur on the farm, or in handling of a single animal, can easily spread through the 
food product in the plant. Furthermore, when intermediaries co-mingle beef from several 
sources, failure in one large batch can quickly spread to consumers in a large geographic 
area (Hennessy and Roosen 2000). Testing of a product at different stages is often 
difficult (and rapid tests are not available). Incentive problems occur because it is 
difficult for packers to reward farmers for caretaking, and farmers have no incentive to 
take additional care in production or transport to reduce the likelihood of problems at the 
packer level; nor do packers that sell the product to intermediaries that co-mingle beef 
from several sources have market incentive to adopt technologies that reduce pathogens 
in the plant source.  
Interconnectivity gives rise to complementarities in input use (care in one area may 
increase the likelihood of care given in other aspects of production). The presence of 
complementarities among activities means that there may be benefits that arise from 
complementary activities that cannot be assigned to the marginal product of any 
individual activity (Goodhue and Rausser 1999). A change in the cost of one activity is 
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likely to move a whole cluster of complementary activities in the food production system. 
This may explain Colatore and Caswell’s (2000) finding that seafood plants implemented 
control measures beyond the minimum mandated by regulation. 
A packer facing the problem of downstream risks might choose to provide incentives 
to input suppliers for documented production practices. With complementarity in inputs, 
a change in the price of one practice (e.g., an incentive paid by the packer firm for 
feeding withdrawal) is likely to bring along other complementary practices, such as more 
careful tracking of transportation practices. An alternative to payment of incentives to 
input suppliers is to purchase control of the input supply (i.e., shift ownership and control 
of production or transport to the packer firm). In this case, increasing vertical 
coordination can redistribute the risks and rents associated with reduced risk.  
The complexity of most food production today suggests the importance of consider-
ing food safety problems from a systems perspective. A good example of such an 
approach is the action plan developed by FDA, FSIS, and Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) to eliminate Salmonella enteritidis (SE) illness due to eggs 
(President’s Council on Food Safety 1999). Underlying the action plan was a risk 
assessment model. The risk assessment model indicated that multiple interventions would 
achieve more reductions in SE illness than would a single point of intervention. The use 
of a risk assessment approach allowed combining information about the risk, sources of 
risk, potential for controls throughout the egg production system, and identified potential 
sites for intervention. The identified advantage of multiple interventions suggested 
following a broadly based policy approach across stages of production, instead of 
focusing on a single stage of production.   
Figure 2, from the President’s Council on Food Safety (1999), shows the stages of 
egg production and the agencies responsible at each stage. The action plan identifies a set 
of activities at each stage. Producers and packer/processors can choose between two 
strategies designed to give equivalent performance in terms of reduction in SE at the egg 
production and packer/processor stages. The first strategy (Strategy I) focuses efforts at 
farm-level testing and egg diversion; the second strategy (Strategy II) directs more  
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FIGURE 2. Egg safety from production to consumption 
 
resources to the packer/processor level and includes a lethal treatment, or “kill step” (and 
HACCP plan), at this stage. Both strategies include common features of regulatory 
presence on the farm (e.g., control of chicks from SE flocks) and at the packer/processor 
(e.g., mandated prerequisite programs of sanitary controls, washing). In addition to the 
interventions at production and packer/processor stages, the action plan sets refrigeration 
standards for the distribution and retail stages to ensure that reductions in SE are 
preserved at later stages in the food supply chain.  The flexibility offered to the industry 
in choosing between strategies for control at the producer and packing/processor levels 
allows for development of incentive structures consistent with the overall objectives of 
eliminating SE illnesses. The action plan explicitly identifies performance measures 
(output standards) to be used (e.g., reduced illnesses, SE isolates, and number of SE 
outbreaks) and the responsible agency for each stage in the farm-to-table continuum. 
Although the action plan for SE in eggs is still early in its implementation, it 
provides a good example of how a system-wide approach might be used. In this case, the 
systems approach facilitated the development and coordination of public and private 
strategies across the egg production system. The risk assessment model focuses on the 
desired public health outcome. The plan allows industry flexibility in developing and 
coordinating incentives across stages  (production and processing/packing). Costs 
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incurred under this systems approach are likely to be smaller than when interventions 
focus on only one point in the food chain. This is an example of how risk assessment can 
interface with economic incentives, and it will be interesting to review the plan’s impact 
on Salmonella control costs in a few years. 
 
Conclusions Regarding Lessons and Future  
Directions for Research 
There are four lessons we take away from this review of the literatures on pesticides 
and microbial hazards. The first lesson is that the distribution of costs (and resulting 
transitional costs) is likely to be more important than market price effects, at least for the 
regulations imposed up to this point. That is, food prices and availability for consumers 
are rarely the issues in regulation impacts. This is partly because supply can be shifted to 
different regions, plants, or even countries. It is also partly a result of past balancing of 
costs and benefits in making regulatory decisions. The structural impacts that lead to 
painful economic adjustments, as when production becomes infeasible in a particular 
region or when small firms in rural areas go out of business, are more important than 
market price impacts. A second lesson is that regulation has an impact on long-run 
incentives to invest in new technologies or inputs and therefore is likely to bias the nature 
of productivity growth. Measuring these long-run costs and benefits to society is much 
more difficult, because the counterfactual cannot be observed; however, these impacts are 
important to consider in the design of new regulation. This leads to our third lesson: the 
most important reason to analyze costs is to choose among regulatory alternatives. 
Greater benefits can be achieved more quickly at lower cost to society with incentives-
based measures. Allowing market adjustments to mitigate costs and improving upon 
existing market incentives will be the most effective ways to reach public health goals. 
Our fourth lesson is that a risk-based systems approach can be the best way to understand 
the costs, incentives, and risk outcomes resulting from alternative interventions. This 
approach is difficult due to patchwork regulatory authority over different parts of the 
food chain and due to the data required for risk assessment. 
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Given these lessons from the literature, what can we say about the need for research 
and data?  Looking to the future, we can see increased attention to addressing microbial 
hazards, rising food safety standards, growing international trade of food products, 
emerging technologies that reduce information costs, and increased feasibility of public 
and private coordination. In that context, we have identified four areas for research and 
data collection. The first and most important is to adapt the conceptual framework for 
evaluating alternative regulatory instruments to the specifics of regulating risks from 
microbial hazards. We do not have any analysis of how alternative regulatory actions 
would alter microbial hazard reduction outcomes, incentives, innovation, or benefit/cost 
ratios. Some differences in implicit standards already exist which could provide data for 
analysis, such as the product specifications imposed on beef purchased for school 
lunches. Given the strong market incentives evident in microbial food safety, it will be 
important to identify the appropriate role for government intervention so as not to 
introduce inefficiencies through regulatory overkill. The second, and related, area for 
research is the impact of new information technologies (e.g., rapid tests, genetic 
fingerprinting) on the market failure in microbial food safety. We need to understand how 
such technologies can aid in setting performance standards and in helping the food 
industry to respond more efficiently to standards. A third area for economics research is 
to examine the interaction of higher domestic standards with international trade. The 
distributional effects of regulation are more likely to be between domestic production and 
trade in the future. We need to know whether standards are applied in equivalent ways to 
domestic production and imports and to better understand U.S. comparative advantage in 
the production of safety attributes. Finally, a fourth area for future research is the 
interdisciplinary field of risk assessment applied to the entire food chain, which is still in 
its infancy. The SE risk assessment model for shell eggs and egg products illustrates the 
ability to assemble and analyze data across various stages of the food production system 
in order to achieve a science-based plan for food safety improvements. Because such 
research requires expensive data collection, efforts in this area should be directed toward 
the most important public health risks.    
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Our concluding comment is that economic analysis will be particularly useful for 
evaluating future alternatives for microbial hazards, because it is directed toward 
understanding system-wide impacts and adjustments. We may not yet know what 
industry costs look like in a risk-based integrated system. But economists can help to 
identify the kind of system that will foster innovation and efficiency in meeting public 
health goals.
  
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1.  There are also a few studies of the cost impacts of regulations regarding growth hormones or antibiotic 
use in livestock production; we did not find any studies of mycotoxin or toxic waste regulatory costs (as 
they relate to food safety) in the published literature. 
 
2.  One of the difficulties of evaluating interventions to control pathogens is that their effectiveness is 
gesnerally measured under laboratory conditions where samples are intentionally inoculated with high 
levels of pathogens. In meat processing plants, levels of contamination are low, and many more samples 
would be needed to assess the effectiveness of a technology. 
 
3.  Another source of higher costs might be greater sanitation and process control deficiencies in small 
plants. Ollinger (2000) found that such deficiencies were negatively associated with firm and plant size. 
 
4.  Given the demand for data, application of probabilistic models is more realistic when confined to 
examining particular hazards and linkages, in contrast to examining the entire food production system.
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